Zakah, Moderation, and Aggregate Consumption by Munawar Iqbal: Comments by Hasan, Zubair















Zakah, Moderation and Aggregate Consumption in an Islamic Economy 
JRIE Vol. 3, No. 1, Summer 1405/1985 
 
 
1 – Comments: Zubair Hasan 
Associate Professor 
Kulliyyah of Economics 
International Islamic University 




Muslim economists have of late shown much interest in formulating a 
consumption function for explaining the process of income determination or distribution 
in an economy regulated by Islamic values and injunctions. Munawar Iqbal presents in 
his note a critical review of some of the writings
(1) in the area primarily "to show that 
the Islamic economists ... have committed some theoretical mistakes" in their 
formulations (p.46). 
 
Iqbal's mission is not devoid of success. He rightly points out that the works he 
examined do not present any Islamic theory of consumption. They seek to explain 
merely the effects of Islamic teachings on the existing secular models and remain, for 
that reason, firmly anchored in the Keynesian tradition (p. 46). His rejection of 
Metwally's claim that Islam directs to relate consumption only to current income (not 
wealth) is valid (p.47). Likewise his demonstration that Metwally overestimates the 
effects of  Zakah on propensity to consume (pp. 50-51) while Darwish and Zain 
underestimate the same (p.53) looks convincing. Also, Iqbal's introduction of  Zakah 
collection charges into the picture vide his equations (27) to (30) is a welcome 
refinement, though of marginal significance. 
 
However, beyond a few pertinent points of the sort stated above, Iqbal's note is not 
very illuminating. He tends to confuse issues, does not always keep his formulations 
error-free and overstretches his argument for arriving at conclusions which are hardly 
new by any measure. Some of his main weaknesses are briefly indicated below: 92                                                     Zubair Hasan (1 - Commentator) 
I 
First take the vital issue of consumers' rationality. Iqbal agrees that "in the ideal 
Islamic system consumers will behave neither as spendthrifts nor as misers" (p.47). 
However, in his view the capitalist model also has exactly the same notion of 
rationality. He supports Fahim Khan on the point that "the secular assumption of 
rational behavior for utility maximization implies that the consumer will neither be a 
miser nor a spendthrift" (p.48). Interestingly, none of them, Iqbal or Khan, explains how 
he deduces this implication, nor quotes any authority on the point. 
 
I have already refuted this view of rationality claimed for secular economics in my 
comments on Fahim Khan (Hasan pp.79-80) and must reiterate that it has nothing to do 
with such value loaded concepts as extravagance or miserliness. Iqbal confuses the 
matter by contradicting his above stated position later. He writes: 
"For a self-centered individual of the secular model, very little will fall in this 
category (israf) because he may well derive 'pleasure' from lavish spending on 
himself and hence is quite 'rational' by the definition of that model" (p.48). 
 
It must be added that the secular view of rationality is not violated also if one is a 
miser and hoards wealth to have 'pleasure' from looking at his treaure when he pleases. 
Secular economics grants such pleasure legitimacy and the liquidity preference theory 
justifies interest as a reward to forego the same. Utility need not have an externally 
injected ethical content in secular economics. 
 
Secular macro theory has a straightforward view that in a ceteris paribus case the 
consumer is rational if in allocating his current income he balances the satisfaction from 
savings against that derived from consumption in such a way as to get equi-marginal 
returns. Exactly where the balance will be struck depends on a number of factors. These 
include also the individual's temperament. He will doubtless save more if he is of a 
thrifty disposition than if he were of a less provident type (Brooman p.104). Clearly this 
in no way implies, as Iqbal and Khan imagine, that the consumer in secular model will 
neither be a miser nor a spendthrift. 
 
The misconception that this rationality view is common to both models-secular 
and Islamic-leads Iqbal to the logical conclusion that the level of israf will be zero in 
each case. But then moderation i.e. avoidance of israf in consumption does not remain, 
contrary to the learned opinion, the distinctive feature of the Islamic model. To 
overcome the difficulty Iqbal argues: 
"There may still be a lower level of consumption in the Islamic economy than the 
secular economy because of differences in individual perceptions about what 
constitutes israf" (p.48). 
 
One may reasonably ask why Iqbal compares here one economy with the other 
because a moment earlier he was vigorously raising the warning signals: "one should 
not forget that one is comparing 'models' or ideal states and not actual economies". 
(p.47). Later he unceremoniously discarded by implication the identical rationality 
assumption in constructing equation (31) where 'f' is the parameter representing the 
level of israf-not perceptional differences-in a secular economy (not model) (p.55). The 
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Again, Iqbal presumes that israf is likely to be lower in an Islamic model, But he 
does not agree with Khan that it will partly be so because the Islamic consumer would 
face a smaller basket of consumption than a secular consumer. He is right but his 
argument for rejecting Khan's proposition is redundant. Iqbal says: 
 
"A smaller basket does not per se lead to a lower propensity to consume as long 
as the consumer has a sufficiently large number of commodities in the basket 
(which in fact is the case) and is free to substitute one commodity for the other." 
(p.55) 
 
Evidently he fails to realise that the relevant factor is neither the number of the 
commodities in the basket nor the substitution possibility, it is the money value of the 
basket that alone can clinch the issue. A person can spend much more on permitted 
goods only than the other does on both the permitted and the prohibited ones because 
of, say, temperamental difference (Hasan p. 81 n). 
 
Last but important, Iqbal like his precursors, is not very sure of the issue he wants 
to investigate. His declared objective is to examine the effect of Zakah and moderation 
on aggregate consumption in an Islamic economy. This he could do neatly on the 
assumption of given group consumption propensities as I have done in section III 
below. However, Iqbal chose to show how secular model propensities to consume 
would tend to change under the impact of Zakah and moderation. This is a much bigger 
task. Many more factors are involved and their interactions are complicated. Therefore, 
macroeconomic analysis tends to proceed generally on the assumption of table 
propensities. Iqbal fails to take note of these facts and this is one reason why he could 
not arrive at any firm conclusions. However, I treat him below within his framework. 
 
II 
Iqbal's mathematical manipulations have a number of blemishes.
(2) Here we 
indicate some of the major ones only. 
 
Iqbal observes that the  Zakah payers transfer a certain proportion ( a ) of  their 
income to Zakah recipients. This income is only a portion of Y i.e, b Y. The amount of 
Zakah payments should therefore be specified as a b Y and not as a Y. Consequently, 
equation (2) in Iqbal (p. 48) should be: 
( )( ) [ ] (1)                          Y     b   1   a C 1 b d - a - + d + =  
 
This error vitiates some of the major mathematical formulations in Iqbal, and a 
number of his equations need correction for the same. Of course, one can express Zakah 
Z as a proportion of the aggregate income Y. One can for example write Z = a
* Y. But 
then we have a b Y = a
* Y or a
* = a b  where a
* is less than both a and b because each 
one of these parameters is a positive fraction. Iqbal uses a in place of  a
* implying an 
overvaluation of Zakah incorporated in his affected equations. It is queer that he does 
not provide any reason for his linking Zakah payments to Y instead of b Y, 
The lapse assumes significance in the case of Iqbal's expression (35) which is: 
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where 'c' is the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) of the Zakah payers and 'd' of 
the  Zakah recipients (d > c), 'f' is the proportion of  Zakah payers' income ( b  Y) 
constituting israf in consumption, and ' σ' is the proportion of their income specifying 
net Zakah payments. 
 
However, if one substitutes σ b Y for the inappropriate σ Y in equation (31) of 
Iqbal, the above expression becomes: 
(2)                                         ) 1 ( cf ) c d ( s - >< s -  
 
It is important to note that while in Iqbal's (35) b plays a role in deciding if the 
marginal propensity to consume in an Islamic model (MPC1) is less or more than that in 
a secular model (MPCs), in its revised version given in (2) above b just does not appear, 
showing that it has nothing to do with the fact whether MPC1 - MPC, will be positive or 
negative. It is only after the sign of the difference has been determined on the basis 
specified in (2) that b would enter into the picture to influence the determination of its 
magnitude, positive or negative,
(3) This role of b follows from the following corrected 
version of (34) in Iqbal. 
 
















One serious consequence of the correction is that it requires a revision of the entire 
sensitivity analysis, specially the tables, in Iqbal (pp. 56-58). However, more important 
is the question whether, even after the revision of tables, such analysis would have 
utility commensurate with the effort involved. Presumably more can be obtained and 
with ease from the diagrams given below than from Iqbal's cumbersome tables, 
 
Equation (3) above can be written as under: 
 
(4)                                       ) 1 (   cf   ) c d (     MPC MPC s 1 s - - s - b = -  
 
where c, d, b, σ and f are all positive fractions. Assuming c, d, and b as given, let us put: 
 
m ) - (1   c     and
p ) c d (






This transforms (4) into: 
(5)                                                          ) mf p ( x b - =  
 
It is the equation of a straight line, b being an additional factor influencing its 
position in the plane. By definition, P varies directly and m varies inversely with σ. The 
equation depicts inverse relationship between x and f independent of the value of b, 
Further, 
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Under the assumptions stated above for equation (5) the following diagram brings 


















It follows from this simple diagram that the difference x is a decreasing function of 
israf f along any straight line such as σ1. It remains positive (MPC1 > MPCs) until f = f1 
but assumes negative values as f increases beyond f 1. In contrast, for any given value off 
say f 1, x varies directly with σ along a line such as 'ad' and moves up from a negative 
value 'af1' to a positive one like 'bf1' as σ exceeds σ1. Whether the difference (MPC1 – 
MPCs) will be positive or negative would, in a particular situation, depend on which of the 
two opposing forces, f and σ, operating on x is stronger. To illustrate, if σ = σ2 their net 
effect is positive as measured by bf1. But it would be completely neutralized as f increases 
to f2 and would assume negative values (e.g. ef3) if f increases further beyond f2. 
 
In the above discussion we assumed c, d, and b as given. If changes in only c and 
d are allowed such that the constraint d > c remains intact, both p and m may change but 
the main relationships discussed above would remain undisturbed. Presumably it would 
be more revealing to investigate the implications if b is allowed to change. For this, let 
us put (p - mf) = A. We have from (5) 
 
(7)                                                              A x b =  
 
This again is the equation of a straight line passing through the origin. If p and m 
are held constant, A varies inversely with f, remains positive so long as p > mf but 
would become negative once the increasing f makes p < mf. Interestingly an increase in 
b would make the magnitude of x larger (and vice versa) in each case i.e. whether A is 




















It follows that for any given b = b0 x varies inversely with israf along the QT line, 
and the magnitude of x, positive or negative, varies directly with b along any line such 
as f0 or f3. The crucial point is that b in no way affects the slope of the lines. 
 
Lastly, Iqbal writes "f is the parameter representing the level of israf in a secular 
economy and its value ranges from zero to one" (P.55). The statement is untidy in 
several ways. First, f in Iqbal does not show strictly the level of israf, it shows the ratio 
of Group I consumption which constitutes israf. Second, in the Islamic consumption 
model depicted in his equation (31) Iqbal specifies moderation i.e. israf free income 
proportion as (1-f). It is difficult to understand how moderation will be promoted in the 
Islamic model if israf f rises in the secular model? Third, the interval defined as 0 ≤ f ≤ 
is faulty. For if f = 1, the entire consumption of the Zakah payers beyond its component 
in 'a' would vanish in an effort to avoid israf. Clearly, the term (1 - f) c[b y - σ Y] in 
equation (31) will become zero. A more sensible interval would presumably be 0 ≤ f ≤ 
0.25 implying that at the most 25% of the consumption of the rich would constitute israf 
in a secular model from the Islamic viewpoint.
(4) It would tend to vanish if the same 
model is Islamized. lqbal's own sensitivity analysis tables assign f the maximum value 
of 0.20 only. 
 
III 
Writers in the area of Islamic macroeconomic theory seem to be obsessed with a 
desire to introduce moderation-avoidance of israf-in their models as a compensatory 
factor for the consumption increasing potential of Zakah. They are usually haunted by 
the fear that increased consumption would reduce savings and investment in the 
economy slowing down its rate of growth compared to a secular model. Such obsession 
is meaningless, fear misplaced. Important for the believers is not primarily the 
superiority or otherwise of the Islamic models over the secular ones but the moulding of 
their thinking, behaviour and social institutions according to the dictates of the Shariah, 
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On the rational plane, one must recognize that the concept of moderation in 
consumption is vague as israf is not a verifiable quantity. The consumer himself may 
not usually be able to separate israf from legitimate requirements. An external observer 
like an economist is all the more a poor judge in the matter. In contrast, Zakah including 
voluntary expenditure in the way of Allah is at once objective and a quantifiable 
variable. It is better to desist from obscuring its impact on aggregate consumption by 
introducing negative  israf i.e. moderation as a balancing factor in an Islamic model. 
Such models can rarely have descriptive utility or predictive value. Presumably one 
should prefer analyzing the impact of Zakah on consumption in an Islamic model with 
the assumption that the level of israf is zero. Then one can describe how the results are 
likely to change if  israf does take place. We may explain this approach by using a 























Here C is the consumption function of the Zakah payers with Y1 income and a1 the 
minimum consumption constraint. The corresponding values for Zakah recipients are C2 
Y2 and a 2. Z is the amount of Zakah transfers-calculated on appropriate basis- from the 
payers to the recipients. The amount could be gross or net depending on whether Z 
includes or excludes collection charges and intrapayer transfers. The slopes of C 1 and C2 
indicate that the MPC of the payers is smaller than the MPC of the recipients. 
 
Before Zakah transfers the entire Y 2 is consumed by assumption (y2 = a2). After 
transfers, Y 2 increases to Y 2 + Z and Y 1 is reduced to Y 1 - Z. As a consequence, the 
consumption of the payers is reduced by TR and of the recipients increased by T' R'. 
The slope of C 2  being greater than of C 1 ,T' R' > TR. Hence, for given 
2 1 Y Y Y + =  
aggregate consumption must increase as a net result of Zakah transfers, Savings are 
obviously reduced. 
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Now, if israf is introduced into the picture, the slope of C 1 will tend to rise as 
extravagance of the rich increases. The positive effect of  Zakah on aggregate 
consumption will not, however, be reversed - though progressively reduced - so long as 
the increasing slope of C 1 under the impact of israf remains less than that of C2. It will 
be zero when the two slopes become equal. The net Zakah effect would be negative-
because of it, aggregate consumption would be less and savings more-only when israf 
makes C 1  become steeper than C 2 .  Such possibilities are expected to be rare in an 
Islamic economy. Therefore, the conclusion drawn in the above paragraph is likely to 
remain intact. 
 
To my mind it is not israf, but some other factors which require more serious 
thought and investigation in formulating a consumption function in an Islamic 
economy. Some of these are briefly indicated below. 
 
1) An individual's consumption expenditure depends  inter alia on his total 
resources. There is an a priori expectation that his consumption will rise with the level 
of resources but in such a way that it takes a smaller proportion of them the larger they 
are. This relationship however is not the consumption function as defined in the 
writings of Muslim economists reviewed by Iqbal. They relate consumption not to 
resources but to income, and there may be considerable difference between the two 
cases. Iqbal does mention this deficiency in Islamic models but does not provide even 
hints for an alternative construct. 
 
2) These models leave out not only the assets part of the consumer's resources but 
even income here means his current income i.e. which accrues during the same period 
in which his consumption expenditure is done. However, most people receive their 
incomes in arrears. It is last month's income for example which A is spending this 
month. Why should then one not relate the consumption of a given period t to the 
income of the preceding period t -1? Again, his consumption may also be influenced by 
expectations about his income in the future. Time horizon variations may influence even 
a static consumption function of the sort discussed in Iqbal. 
 
3) Even the conclusion stated above that the net effect of Zakah and avoidance of 
israf on consumption in an Islamic model is likely to remain positive is subject to two 
qualifications: (i) both the  Zakah payers and recipients  stay on their respective 
consumption functions, and (ii) these consumption functions are linear. But the 
qualifications may not hold good. 
 
Income tends to be associated with social status and different social groups have 
different norms of consumption expenditures. Redistribution through  Zakah, as 
otherwise, gives more income to a 'lower' group and its members-at least some of them-
may respond by joining a higher group and thereby change their consumption standards. 
For example, in Fig. 3 they may jump from C2 to a higher consumption function passing 
through say S', instead of moving from R" to T'. If Zakah payers remain on C 1, merely 
moving from T to T", consumption would increase considerably. "Nothing can be taken 
for granted about the result of income redistribution; it is necessary to know something 
about the MPCs of the income groups concerned, and also to assess mobility between 
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Again, a linear consumption function may be a convenient analytical device but a 
curve say of the sort C = a + b (Y - a)
½ ,where Y > a, is a closer approximation of 
reality. It means that MPC on the same curve in Fig. 3 will be different at points Y2 and 
Y1.
(5) How will that affect the analysis must be considered. 
 
Last but not the least, the consumption function C = a + b Y which forms the basis 
of discussion in lqbal as in others is not a concept which describes consumers' 
behaviour over time. "It indicates a set of simultaneously existing possibilities which 
arise from the state of preferences at a particular moment." (Brooman P. 122). This may 
serve well at the most for very short periods. But to suppose that the shape and position 
of the function remain unchanged say over a decade would be a very dubious 
proposition. 
 
Given sufficient time, an individual's income level, magnitude and composition of 
his net assets, his attitudes and even temperament, liquidity preferences, price levels, 
relative prices, national income and its distribution, tax structure, business income 
policies etc. may all show considerable changes having far reaching repercussions' on 
consumption. The imponderables are indeed too many to permit any reasonably precise 
conclusion concerning the effects of factors like  Zakah and  israf on aggregate 
consumption if a secular model is Islamized by introducing these variables into it. Even 
in secular economics, the consumption function now seems to be in a state of flux. 
 
For the short run, one may prefer to presume that, other things being equal, 
aggregate consumption would be higher and savings lower if secular model is 
Islamized, as some writers in the area have chosen to do. However, this need not to be 
taken as an unsavoury inference from the viewpoint of investment needed for growth. 
One must emphasize that as a productivity raising factor, there is not much of a 
difference between consumption and investment in the case of developing economies 
(Meier pp. 269-70)-a group to which most of the Muslim countries belong. 
Furthermore, to the extent increased consumption tends to enlarge the size of the market 
it may help, not impede, economic growth in the Muslim countries. 
 
IV 
To conclude, Iqbal's effort is good in patches, suffers from some serious errors, 




1. Some important omissions are AI-Jarhi, Mehdi and Naqvi. Their writings 
contain some methodological merits and theoretical clarifications which Iqbal would 
have found useful for his work. For example Mehdi's comments on consumers' 
rationality in secular economics are quite instructive and could have saved Iqbal from 
repeating the misconceptions contained in Khan. Likewise, Al-Jarhi and Naqvi's 
comments on him give some formulations concerning propensity to save. As Y = C + S 
propositions about savings may be translated into propositions about consumption and 
vice versa. Iqbal could have benefited from Naqvi's income groupings which I have 
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2. Some of the minor errors are for example in equations (4) and (5), (8), (9) and 
(10). The correct versions of these equations are given below. Only the right hand side 
of the equations is provided. 
 
(10)   and   (9)                                                                                 c) - (d  
(8)                                                                             c)Y - (d  
(5)   and   (4)                                                ) 1 (   ) 1 (  
a
a
b a b a d - + - - + b
 
 
Since Iqbal is dealing with linear functions APCt-APCs must be the same as MPC1 
-MPCs. This simple statement was enough instead of demonstrating the fact repeatedly. 
His equations (4) and (5), (9) and (10), (15) and (16), (18) and (19), (21) and (22), (25) 
and (26), (33) and (34) hardly serve any useful purpose. In any event, one derivation 
instead of two was enough in each case. 
 
3. This is demonstrated later. See Fig. 2. 
4. The value is purely arbitrary implying only that the upper limit as 1 for f is too 
high, rather naive. 
5. The same curve will be steeper at Y2 than at Y1, i.e. MPC at Y2 shall be higher 
than at Y 1 . This would complicate the analysis of the effects of Zakah and israf on 
aggregate consumption in an Islamic model, and it may become all the more difficult to 
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